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I. INTRODUCTION
A group of conservative Texas legislators introduced a new form of
litigation into the state earlier this month in an attempt to restrict the
five billion dollar increase in the 1991-92 budget. In a petition for a
writ of mandamus, they asked the Texas Supreme Court to order the
Legislative Budget Board (LBB)-whose members include Lt. Gov.
Bob Bullock, House Speaker Gib Lewis, and eight other Democratic
legislators-to follow procedures enforcing the state's constitutional
spending limitation.' The supreme court denied the legislators' leave
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Texas. Professor Maggs clerked for Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy during the Supreme Court's 1989 Term and has practiced law with
Robert H. Bork. Michael D. Weiss contributed to this article.
1. See Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Heflin v. Legislative Budget Board, No. D-1392
(Tex. filed Aug. 8, 1991).
The plaintiffs in the action included Representative Talmadge Heflin, Senator Cyndi Krier,
Representative Ted Kamel, Representative Warren Chisum, Representative Fred Hill, Representative Glenn Repp, Representative Harvey Hildebran, Representative Billy Clemons, Representative John Culberson, Representative Pat Haggerty, Representative A.R. Ovard,
Representative Bob Turner, Representative Will Hartnett, Representative Kevin Brady, Representative John Carona, Representative Gerald V. Yost, Representative Alan Schoolcraft,
Representative M.A. Taylor, Representative Jim Horn, Representative William N. Thomas,
Loyce McCarter, and Jeannine Stroth. Id.
The LBB, in addition to Lt. Gov. Bullock, includes Speaker of the House of Representatives
Gibson "Gib" Lewis, Representative Hugo Berlanga, Senator Chet Brooks, Senator Bob Glasgow, Representative James Hury, Senator John Montford, Senator Carl Parker, Representative Jim Rudd, and Representative Richard "Ric" Williamson. Id.
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to file the mandamus petition; 2 nevertheless, the incident has considerable significance. For the first time in recent memory, Texas legislators have asked the judiciary to settle a dispute with a body of the
state government. Although unsuccessful in this instance, the action
may have inaugurated a new mechanism through which minorityparty politicians in Texas will insist upon the rule of law.
II.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION AND THE
1991-92 TEXAS BUDGET

The lawsuit brought by the house and senate members focused on
article VIII, section 22 of the Texas Constitution, which limits increases in government spending.3 This constitutional provision states
that the rate of growth of appropriations from non-dedicated state
revenues cannot exceed the rate of growth of the state's economy. To
implement this limitation, the legislature created the LBB from the
ranks of the house and senate.4 Procedures codified in the government code require the LBB to estimate the economy's growth and to
establish an amount of the state tax revenue that the legislature may
appropriate each biennium.5 The legislature cannot pass a budget
that exceeds the amount established by the LBB.6
2. See Heflin v. Legislative Budget Board, No. D-1392 (Tex. Aug. 12, 1991). The court's
one sentence order does not state the reasons for its decision. Id.
3. The central portion of this constitutional provision states: "In no biennium shall the
rate of growth of appropriations from state tax revenues not dedicated by this constitution
exceed the estimated rate of growth of the state's economy. The legislature shall provide by
general law procedures to implement this subsection." TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 22(a). The
legislature has codified this provision at TEX. GoV'T CODE ANN. § 316.001 (Vernon 1988).
4. The LBB, by statute, must include the lieutenant governor, the speaker of the house of
representatives, the chairmen of the senate state affairs and finance committees, the chairmen
of the house appropriations and ways and means committees, and two other senators and two
other representatives. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 322.001 (Vernon 1988).
5. The relevant statute provides:
(a) Before it submits the budget as prescribed by section 322.008(b), the Legislative
Budget Board shall establish:
(1) the estimated rate of growth of the state's economy from the current biennium to the
next biennium;
(2) the level of appropriations for the current biennium for state tax revenues not dedicated by the constitution; and
(3) the amount of state tax revenues not dedicated by the constitution that could be appropriated for the next biennium within the limit established by the estimated rate of
growth of the state's economy.
Id. § 316.002.
6. Id. § 316.001.
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The Government Code, however, does not specify what should
happen if the LBB fails to establish the amount that the legislature
may appropriate. Two possibilities appear to exist. Under the most
restrictive interpretation, the legislature could not increase appropriations at all without an estimate of the rate of growth of the economy.
This rule would insure that no violation of the constitutional restrictions on spending could occur. Under another interpretation, however, the legislature might increase appropriations by any amount that
it chooses if the LBB does not establish a limit. This latter interpretation effectively would permit any increase in spending.
The LBB, confronted with adamant demands for spending, took
advantage of this ambiguity in the Government Code during the
budgeting process this year. Its members did not estimate the rate of
the economy's growth or establish a growth limitation. All appearances indicate that they understood that their inaction would give
them and their colleagues in the legislature a free hand in enacting a
budget.
The LBB's apparent desire to thwart the constitutional spending
limitation attracted the attention of many conservative legislators and
policy analysts and prompted considerable dissent. On August 7, the
Texas Public Policy Foundation released a study which detailed the
history and subsequent non-enforcement of the limitation.7 Later that
week, nineteen representatives, one senator, and two taxpayers petitioned the Texas Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus ordering the
LBB to estimate the economy's growth rate as required by the Government Code.I The Texas Supreme Court denied legislators' leave to
file the petition three days later without holding a hearing.9 The
grounds for the denial remain unclear because, despite the prominence of the parties and the importance of the question, the supreme
court did not issue an opinion.
On August 12, 1991, following this loss in the court, Senator Cyndi
Krier attempted to prevent passage of the 1991-92 budget on the floor
of the senate. Raising a point of order, she inquired whether the senate may consider a bill making appropriations when the LBB has not

7.

MICHAEL WEISS, THE TEXAS TAX RELIEF ACT AFTER TWELVE YEARS: ADOPTION,

IMPLEMENTATION & ENFORCEMENT (1991) (on file with St. Mary's Law Journal).

8. See Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Heflin v. Legislative Budget Board, No. D-1392
(Tex. filed Aug. 8, 1991).
9. Heflin v. Legislative Budget Bureau, No. D-1392 (Tex. Aug. 12, 1991).
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established a budget limitation. Presiding over the senate, Lt. Gov.
Bullock overruled the point of order. Citing the failed mandamus action, Bullock concluded: "[U]nder present circumstances, there is not
an effective limit on appropriations which the senate may judge appropriation bills." 10 The legislature shortly afterward passed a record
two-year, $59 billion budget, which Governor Ann Richards signed
into law on August 30, 1991.11

Other challenges to the budget may arise in the future. Various
policy organizations already have vowed to undertake litigation. 2 At
present, however, the budget remains intact.
III.

LAWSUITS

BY

STATE OFFICIALS

The legislators who sued the LBB did not originate the idea of using litigation to resolve legal disputes among state officials. Politicians
in other states and in the federal government have had experience
with this kind of lawsuit for some time. A case brought by Kansass
legislators reached the United States Supreme Court in the 1930s.'
Earlier this year, Minnesota legislators prevailed in a suit against the
governor over the validity of the governor's veto of a controversial
labor bill.14 The federal courts have entertained several suits between
Congress or its members and the White House over similar matters.' 5
Lawsuits initiated by representatives and senators, although increasingly common, remain somewhat controversial. Many jurisdictions, through the doctrine of standing, permit only litigants
individually injured by governmental actions to challenge those actions in court.' 6 This limitation poses theoretical problems to suits by
10. Prepared Statement of Lt. Gov. Bob Bullock in Response to Senator Krier's Point of
Order, distributed Aug. 12, 1991, at 5:55 p.m. on the Senate Floor.
11. Ken Herman, Governor Grumbles, Signs $59 Billion Budget "Mass", HOUSTON POST,
Aug. 31, 1991, at Al.
12. One organization, Texans Against State Income Taxes, has decided to bring a lawsuit
in a state district court. See David Elliot, Legislators Broke Law in Budget, Group Says, AusTIN AMERICAN STATESMAN, Sept. 13, 1991, at Al.

13. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 436 (1939).
14. Seventy-Seventh Minn. State Senate v. Carlson, 472 N.W.2d 99 (Minn. 1991).
15. See Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Moore v. United States House
of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430,

432 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
16. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982). (United States Constitution establishes this rule in
Art. III's "case or controversy" requirement).
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legislators. Under the customary view of our democracy, legislators
merely represent the electorate and have no more personal stake in
the outcome of the legislative process than their constituents. By
bringing a lawsuit against other elected officials, legislators challenge
the conception of legislators merely representing the electorate by as-

serting that they individually suffer harm when they lose a legislative
struggle. 7
In the situation in Texas, however, the legislators did not have to
assert any greater interest in having the LBB follow the law than that
of their constituents. Taxpayers in Texas traditionally have had
standing to challenge illegal government actions relating to taxes and
the budget. The Texas courts, indeed, recognized taxpayer standing
as early as 1914 in the famous "chicken salad" case. " Taxpayers in
that suit sought to restrain the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts
from authorizing expenditures by Governor O.B. Colquitt at an Austin hotel for chicken salad, punch, and other food served at a party.
The court of civil appeals held that taxpayers in Texas have a right to
stop illegal spending of tax dollars. 9 The legislators who sued the
LBB thus sought a remedy that any taxpayer might seek.
Why the supreme court rejected the legislators' legal challenge remains a mystery. The court might have refused to reach the merits
either because it found mandamus the wrong procedural device or
because it considered itself improper as the original forum for adjudicating the legislators' claim against the LBB.2° Given a lack of precedents of similar actions, the appropriate procedure remains unclear.
Yet, if the supreme court did see a procedural defect, in fairness it
should have identified it in an opinion. Lawsuits by legislators now
have come to Texas and other legislative litigants undoubtedly will file
similar actions in the future. They should not have to waste resources
experimenting until they find a procedure that satisfies the silent
court.
17. Judge Robert H. Bork forcefully discussed the idea of politicians having standing to

challenge government action in Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J.,
dissenting).

18. Terrel v. Middleton, 187 S.W. 367, 374 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1916, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).

19. Id. at 368-69.
20. The legislators argued in their petition for writ of mandamus that TEX. CONST. art.
VIII, § 22 and TEX. GoV'T CODE § 22.002(c) (Vernon 1981) gave the supreme court jurisdiction. See Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Heflin v. Legislative Budget Board, No. D-1392, at
4-5 (Tex. filed Aug. 9, 1991).
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The supreme court, alternatively, may have denied leave to file the
petition for a writ of mandamus on grounds that the court should not
use its judicial power to order the LBB to undertake its duties under
the Government Code. In the absence of a procedural obstacle to the
mandamus action, this alternative seems likely to explain the court's
decision. No one disputed that the LBB had failed to fulfill its obligation to estimate the growth of the economy. Yet if the court decided
not to act despite a violation of the government code, it insured that
only political strength would govern the budgeting process.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Texas courts should have power to force the LBB to follow the law
and to establish the economy's growth rate. The state's voters, in approving the constitutional spending limitation in 1978, did not want
to leave such limitations to the vagaries of politics. The constitutional
amendment adding the budget growth limitation instructs the legislature "to adopt by general laws procedures to implement" it. 2 ' The
legislature has placed these procedures in the government code, and
the courts should enforce them like any other statutes. Although the
present suit failed, others apparently will follow. Politicians in the
minority cannot force the majority to adopt their policies, but they
can insist on the rule of law.

21. TEX. CONST. art VIII., § 22(a).
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